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RATS, TRAPS, AND TRADE SECRETS 
ELIZABETH A. ROWE* 
Abstract: Technology has facilitated both the amount of trade secrets that are 
now stored electronically, and the rise of cyber intrusions. Together, this has cre-
ated a storm perfectly ripe for economic espionage. Cases involving unknown or 
anonymous offenders who may not be in the United States and who steal trade 
secrets using remote access tools (“RATs”) are especially problematic. This Art-
icle is the first to address and place trade secret misappropriation within the larg-
er backdrop of cybersecurity. First, it argues that systemic issues related to tech-
nology will continue to make legislative and judicial solutions suboptimal for 
cyber misappropriation. Second, it explores how the rhetoric of war has infiltrat-
ed the national discourse on cybersecurity and cyber misappropriation. Third, the 
Article introduces and coins the acronym TRAP. Standing for “technologically 
responsive active protection,” TRAP serves as a guiding principle to further re-
fine the reasonable efforts requirement for the protection of trade secrets. The Ar-
ticle also critically examines such active defense counterstrike techniques as 
hacking back and the controversy surrounding this potential strategy. 
INTRODUCTION 
Trade secrets are arguably more important to companies now than ever 
before in our history. In fact, since the most recent revisions to our patent laws, 
many believe that trade secrets might be even more important than patents.1 
Accordingly, the theft of trade secrets or trade secret misappropriation from 
company employees and from outsiders, such as competitors and foreign gov-
ernments, is on the rise. Facilitating that ascent is technology. We live in a 
world where the most sensitive proprietary information can be carried on a 
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 1 See, e.g., David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets Are Increasingly Important, 27 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1091, 1104–06 (2012); Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating 
Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 330 (2008); Tom C.W. Lin, Executive Trade Se-
crets, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911, 943 (2012). 
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mobile device in one’s pocket or stored without a device “in the cloud.”2 Alt-
hough technology has made it easy to store vast amounts of data constituting 
trade secret information electronically, the Internet and the rise of cyber intru-
sions into computer systems and networks have created a storm perfectly ripe 
for corporate espionage and trade secret misappropriation.3 This Article refers 
to that type of activity as cyber misappropriation. 
Corporate espionage, particularly from foreign countries, is a significant 
problem for U.S. companies, with some even characterizing it as a war. But the 
true extent of the problem is unclear. Although some believe it is on the scale 
of warfare, others are more skeptical.4 Because the figures are difficult to veri-
fy, they might be exaggerated.5 The rhetoric may also be hyperbolic. Neverthe-
less, we know that corporate espionage and the theft of trade secrets from 
American companies is a problem and will continue to be one. The list of 
companies that have been affected by trade secret misappropriation, either in-
ternally from employees or externally from hackers, is striking.6 Given the in-
tangible nature in which trade secrets exist today, it comes as no surprise that 
these digital threats are so pervasive.7 
What makes the problem so urgent, elusive, and significant is that we do 
not appear to have any effective judicial or legislative tools with which to ad-
dress it.8 Rather, it presents peculiar challenges for which our existing legal 
                                                                                                                           
 2 See generally Sharon K. Sandeen, Lost in the Cloud: Information Flows and the Implications of 
Cloud Computing for Trade Secret Protection, 19 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2014) (examining the impact 
of cloud storage services on trade secrets and their protection).  
 3 See ERIC M. DOBRUSIN & RONALD A. KRASNOW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CULTURE: 
STRATEGIES TO FOSTER SUCCESSFUL PATENT AND TRADE SECRET PRACTICES IN EVERYDAY BUSI-
NESS 264–67 (2d ed. 2012); Aaron J. Burstein, Trade Secrecy as an Instrument of National Security? 
Rethinking the Foundations of Economic Espionage, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 933, 944–46 (2009). 
 4 See infra notes 92–198 and accompanying text (Part III, examining the rhetoric of war that is 
now being applied to the issue of cybersecurity); e.g., S. Kumar, Here’s Why You Shouldn’t Take US-
China Hacking Tensions Too Seriously, FORTUNE (June 8, 2015, 8:36 AM), https://fortune.com/
2015/06/08/heres-why-you-shouldnt-take-us-china-hacking-tensions-too-seriously/ [https://perma.
cc/G796-QFGM] (explaining why the threat of a cyberwar between the United States and China is 
largely overblown and unlikely to happen). 
 5 See, e.g., Zoe Argento, Killing the Golden Goose: The Dangers of Strengthening Domestic 
Trade Secret Rights in Response to Cyber-Misappropriation, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 172, 196–200 
(2014). 
 6 For example, the author has compiled a list of victim companies for which trade secret thefts 
have been prosecuted under the Economic Espionage Act between 2008 and 2013. Among those 
companies represented are: Goodyear, Korn/Ferry International, Motorola, Boeing International, 
CISCO, NASA, SiRF Technology, Goldman Sachs, Societe Generale, GM Motor Company, E.I. du 
Pont de Nemours, Ford Motor Company, Valspar Corporation, Akamai Technologies, Inc., Frontier 
Scientific, Inc., Cargill, Dow Chemical Company, Sanofi-Aventis, CME Group, L-3 Communica-
tions, Teijin Limited, Orbit Irrigation Products, Pittsburgh Corning Corporation, and AMSC. 
 7 See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Contributory Negligence, Technology, and Trade Secrets, 17 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 1, 14–26 (2009). 
 8 See Elizabeth A. Rowe & Daniel M. Mahfood, Trade Secrets, Trade, and Extraterritoriality, 66 
ALA. L. REV. 63, 64–66 (2014). 
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and regulatory framework is not well suited. Although trade secret misappro-
priation occurring within the United States and involving known offenders, 
such as employees, can be redressed in civil litigation, the same is not true for 
cyber misappropriation that originates abroad.9 Of particular concern, and the 
focus of this Article, are the types of cases that involve unknown or anony-
mous offenders, who may or may not be in the United States, and who steal 
trade secrets through hacking or other breaches of cybersecurity that involve 
remote access tools (“RATs”). A RAT can remotely control a victim’s comput-
er and access their files.10 Accessing targets remotely without needing to be on 
the same premises has opened up the world of potential perpetrators and sets 
up an unwieldy cat and mouse game. 
The challenges in this area demonstrate how advances in technology have 
far outpaced the law. Indeed, it may always be that the law will never be suffi-
ciently nimble to adapt to and keep pace with the cyber world. Effectively ad-
dressing cyber misappropriation requires a holistic approach that must involve 
self-help on the part of trade secret holders. Reliance on the government, law 
enforcement, criminal laws, and other legal and judicial remedies have not 
been successful, and it is unlikely that, standing alone, they ever will be. 
The Article begins in Part I by briefly framing the foreign economic espi-
onage problem.11 Part II reviews the current legislative remedies available un-
der both the Economic Espionage Act and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
for addressing cyber misappropriation, and explains why the technological 
landscape makes them ineffective.12 Part III then discusses the war rhetoric 
that often surrounds cyberattacks and the forces that threaten to make this nar-
rative counterproductive.13 In Part IV, the Article critically explores an ap-
proach focused more on self-help and self-defense, integrating both technolog-
ical and human considerations.14 It also considers supplementary initiatives 
that may further contribute to a more comprehensive approach to the problem 
of cyber misappropriation, such as a focus on small companies, and govern-
ment initiatives both in the United States and abroad.15 Finally, the Article 
concludes that companies must look inward and re-conceptualize their roles, 
not as bystanders or onlookers, but as participants responsible for building 
their own technologically responsive active protection (“TRAPs”) and for-
tresses to protect their trade secrets and proprietary information. 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See id. at 69–72. 
 10 See United States v. Yücel, 97 F. Supp. 3d 413, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (providing a description 
of a RAT and how it is used). 
 11 See infra notes 16–35 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 36–91 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 92–198 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 199–298 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 299–328 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE THREAT OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE 
The reports, surveys, and stories are plentiful and paint a vivid picture. A 
cyber espionage unit of the Chinese army breached 115 American companies 
over the course of several years.16 Companies are being attacked at least once a 
week.17 Cyber criminals have stolen up to $1 trillion worth of intellectual 
property in a single year.18 It is no wonder then that cybersecurity is treated as 
a national security matter, not just one related to criminal or intellectual prop-
erty law.19 Indeed, the narrative and rhetoric in the media, as well as among 
politicians, tends to make national security the focus of the problem.20 The 
government has also taken note and focused attention on the problem.21 Al-
though that attention is a welcome and necessary component to combat-
ing these challenges, the question arises as to what role the private sector ought 
to play in the process, and whether the importance of that role is diminished by 
the national security focus. 
International espionage of American trade secrets continues to receive in-
creasing attention.22 In early February 2013, a government report detailed the 
“unrelenting campaign of cyberstealing linked to the Chinese government.”23 
The report identified a group of hackers run by the Chinese People’s Libera-
tion Army, Unit 61398,24 and described a “sophisticated, systematic effort that 
is allegedly condoned, supported, and directed by the Chinese government.”25 
Shortly thereafter, President Obama announced new efforts to prevent the theft 
of U.S. trade secrets abroad.26 The White House coordinator of intellectual 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See MANDIANT CONSULTING, APT 1: EXPOSING ONE OF CHINA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE UNITS 21 
(2013), http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/KA63-CLHS]. 
 17 See PONEMON INST., SECOND ANNUAL COST OF CYBER CRIME STUDY: BENCHMARK STUDY 
OF U.S. COMPANIES 2 (2011), http://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/file/2011_2nd_Annual_Cost_
of_Cyber_Crime_Study%20.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LQ3-WJJW]. 
 18 See Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President on 
Securing Our Nation’s Cyber Infrastructure (May 29, 2009), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-securing-our-nations-cyber-infrastructure [https://perma.cc/233J-BNGP]. 
 19 See infra notes 130–154 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 22–29 and accompanying text. 
 21  See infra notes 22–29 and accompanying text.id.  
 22 See, e.g., Almeling, supra note 1, at 1109–12; see also Gerald O’Hara, Cyber-Espionage: A 
Growing Threat to the American Economy, 19 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 241, 241–42 (2010) (“Alt-
hough threats of economic and industrial espionage have long existed, the international proliferation 
of the Internet makes cyber economic and industrial espionage an especially daunting and potentially 
economy-crippling threat.”); Rowe & Mahfood, supra note 8, at 68. 
 23 See Lolita C. Baldor, US Ready to Strike Back on China Cyberattacks, YAHOO! NEWS (Feb. 
19, 2013, 5:43 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/us-ready-strike-back-china-cyberattacks-224303045--
finance.html [https://perma.cc/6N8A-RABF]. 
 24 See id. 
 25 Rowe & Mahfood, supra note 8, at 68. 
 26 See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY ON MITIGAT-
ING THE THEFT OF U.S. TRADE SECRETS 1–12 (2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
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property enforcement laid out the “whole of government” efforts that would be 
utilized to combat international theft of U.S. trade secrets.27 The White House 
strategy consisted of five components:  
First, we will increase our diplomatic engagement [and] convey our 
concerns to countries where there are high incidents of trade secret 
theft . . . . Second, we will support industry-led efforts to develop 
best practices to protect trade secrets . . . . Third, [the Department of 
Justice] will continue to make the investigation and prosecution of 
trade secret theft by foreign competitors and foreign governments a 
top priority. . . . Fourth, . . . we will conduct a review of our laws to 
determine if further changes are needed to enhance enforcement. . . . 
Lastly, we will increase public awareness of the threats and risks to 
the U.S. economy posed by trade secret theft.28 
The precise numbers and actual extent of economic espionage is difficult 
to ascertain.29 General Keith Alexander, former Director of the National Secu-
rity Agency and Chair of the U.S. Cyber Command, has indicated that the 
amount of intellectual property theft in the United States through cyber espio-
nage is “astounding.”30 Estimates are that we lose hundreds of billions of dol-
lars annually, both from the public and private sector, as a result of this kind of 
activity.31 For a whole host of reasons, however, an accurate number is difficult 
                                                                                                                           
omb/IPEC/admin_strategy_on_mitigating_the_theft_of_u.s._trade_secrets.pdf [https://perma.cc/FB9Z-
VDAS]. 
 27 Victoria Espinel, Launch of the Administration’s Strategy to Mitigate the Theft of U.S. Trade 
Secrets, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Feb. 20, 2013, 2:59 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/02/
20/launch-administration-s-strategy-mitigate-theft-us-trade-secrets [https://perma.cc/YRH8-K8DT]; 
see Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Launches Effort to Stem Trade-Secret Theft, WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2013), 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-02-20/world/37198630_1_trade-secret-theft-trade-secrets-
commercial-secrets [https://perma.cc/77M6-ETGC] (discussing the Obama Administration’s new 
efforts to combat the theft of U.S. trade secrets).  
 28 Espinel, supra note 27; see Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Said to Be Target of Massive Cyber-
Espionage Campaign, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/us-said-to-be-target-of-massive-cyber-espionage-campaign/2013/02/10/7b4687d8-6fc1-11e2-
aa58-243de81040ba_story.html [https://perma.cc/N8FV-SM3W] (“The problem with foreign cyber-
espionage is not that it is an existential threat, but that it is invisible, and invisibility promotes inac-
tion.”). 
 29 See Rowe & Mahfood, supra note 8, at 68. 
 30 See Keith Alexander, Remarks on Cyber Security Threats to the U.S. (July 9, 2012) http://
www.c-span.org/video/?306956-1/cybersecurity-threats-us (commenting on the rate of intellectual 
property theft at minute 42:36). 
 31 See, e.g., Noah C.N. Hampson, Hacktivism: A New Breed of Protest in a Networked World, 35 
B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 511, 516 (2012) (“Hackers are responsible for identity theft, fraud, 
commercial espionage, and other crimes with an annual cost in the trillions of dollars.”); J.P. London, 
Made in China, PROC. MAG., Apr. 2011, at 54, available at http://www.usni.org/magazines/pro
ceedings/2011-04/made-china #footnotes [https://perma.cc/G3CP-JCP9] (“Cyber espionage alone is 
estimated to cost the United States up to $200 billion a year.”). 
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to calculate. For one thing, companies often are not aware that they have been 
victimized.32 Even when discovered, there is no reliable method for determin-
ing and estimating actual losses. Rather, it is left to each individual company to 
disclose the amount of its loss, if it chooses to acknowledge or publicly dis-
close at all. 
It is unlikely that new legislation will adequately address the breadth of 
problems presented by economic espionage and cyber misappropriation.33 Re-
cent attempts at trade legislation have yielded only partial and limited fixes.34 
The reality is that risks are everywhere, whether they are malware-based at-
tacks, intrusions on networks, potential attacks on mobile devices, or potential 
cloud-based attacks.35 Thoughtful consideration of this complex issue requires 
recognition of its place within the larger context of cybersecurity, where all 
kinds of information, from personal consumer information to military secrets, 
can be targeted. In that vein, cyber misappropriation—defined here as the theft 
of trade secrets resulting from cyberattacks—is intertwined with the national 
discourse on and rhetoric that accompanies cyberattacks, as well as the short-
comings of existing laws that govern trade secret misappropriation. 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See infra notes 85–88 and accompanying text (Part II.C.2). 
 33 See generally Christopher B. Seaman, The Case Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101 VA. 
L. REV. 317 (2015) (critiquing and providing arguments against addressing the issue of trade secrecy 
through federal legislation).  
 34 See Rowe & Mahfood, supra note 8, at 69 (discussing ineffective attempts at legislative fixes). 
For example, 
[T]he Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012 . . . amended the Economic Es-
pionage Act of 1996 (EEA) by expanding the scope of prohibited conduct and increas-
ing the maximum penalties. The amendment closes the loophole identified in United 
States v. Aleynikov . . . by redefining a trade secret to include processes used internally 
in connection with services used in commerce. In addition, the Foreign and Economic 
Espionage Penalty Enhancement Act of 2012 increased penalties for violations of the 
EEA, but only for those in § 1831, which targets only trade secret theft intended to ben-
efit a foreign government, agent, or instrumentality. Foreign and Economic Espionage 
Penalty Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 112-269, 126 Stat. 2442 (2013); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1831. These amendments, while potentially helpful in a handful of specific contexts, 
offer only a piecemeal approach to addressing a problem that would be more effectively 
and comprehensively addressed by increasing the usefulness of laws that already exist. 
In this way, and by creating a perception that the problem has been solved, relatively 
modest legislative modifications have the potential to do more harm than good. 
Id. at 69 n.35 (citations omitted). 
 35 See generally SYMANTEC, INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT 20, at 6 (2015), https://www4.
symantec.com/mktginfo/whitepaper/ISTR/21347932_GA-internet-security-threat-report-volume-20-
2015-social_v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8KD-22VM] (“identify[ing], analyz[ing], and provid[ing] in-
formed commentary on emerging trends in attacks, malicious code activity, phishing, and spam”). 
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II. CURRENT LEGISLATIVE WEAPONS 
The two main pieces of legislation that can be used to address the misap-
propriation of trade secrets through cyber misappropriation at a national level 
are the Economic Espionage Act (“EEA”)36 and the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act (“CFAA”).37 Along with the CFAA, there are a number of other 
federal laws that address or touch on cybersecurity, including several regula-
tions within the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission.38 For the pur-
poses of this Article, however, these other federal laws and regulations are not 
directly applicable.  
A. The Economic Espionage Act 
To date, the EEA is the only federal law on trade secret misappropriation 
in the United States. It is a criminal statute. Although there have been repeated 
calls for a federal civil law on trade secret misappropriation, there is currently 
no civil counterpart to the EEA. Additionally, unlike the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act, discussed in section B below,39 the EEA does not currently create a 
private right of action.40 
Generally, the EEA gives federal authorities, under the auspices of the 
U.S. Department of Justice and local federal prosecutors, the power to investi-
gate and prosecute individuals or companies who engage in criminal trade se-
cret misappropriation.41 Judging from the indictments that have been brought 
under the EEA, the vast majority of prosecutions involve employees, former 
employees, and other company “insiders.”42 Acts of corporate espionage by 
outsiders, however, are also covered by the EEA.43 
The prototypical EEA case involves employees who violate their duty of 
confidentiality or loyalty by using or disclosing their employer’s confidential 
business information. For example, in July 2010, two individuals were indicted 
for stealing and selling $40 million worth of trade secret information related to 
General Motors’ hybrid automobile plans.44 The allegations were that the em-
ployees downloaded and saved confidential General Motors’ documents and 
                                                                                                                           
 36 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839 (2012). 
 37 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). 
 38 See Janine S. Hiller & Roberta S. Russell, The Challenge and Imperative of Private Sector 
Cybersecurity: An International Comparison, 29 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 236, 239 (2013). 
 39 See infra notes 61–70 and accompanying text (Part II.B). 
 40 Legislation has been proposed and is currently pending. See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2014, 
S. 2267, 113th Cong. (2014); Trade Secrets Protection Act of 2014, H.R. 5233, 113th Cong. (2014). 
 41 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839. 
 42 The author collected and analyzed a selection of indictments that have been brought under the 
EEA. 
 43 See 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a). 
 44 Indictment at 4, United States v. Qin, No. 10-cr-20454-MOB-RSW (E.D. Mich. July 22, 2010). 
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then gave the information to a Chinese automaker. This is representative of a 
large number of EEA prosecutions in which Chinese nationals are over-
represented relative to other countries.45 
Sections 1831 and 1832 of the EEA define the prohibited conduct under 
the Act.46 Moreover, the decision of which of the two sections to apply turns 
on whether the theft was intended to benefit a foreign government. If so, the 
conduct falls under § 1831.47 Section 1832, in contrast, governs all other thefts 
of trade secrets.48 It applies when there is “intent to convert a trade secret . . . 
related to a product or service used in or intended for use in interstate or for-
eign commerce.”49 The accused must intend or know that the conversion will 
harm the trade secret owner.50 Both § 1831 and § 1832 make an attempt to 
steal and a conspiracy to steal trade secrets a crime.51 Thus, it is conceivable 
that someone may be prosecuted under the EEA even though no trade secrets 
were, in fact, stolen. As one court has explained: “[T]o find a defendant guilty 
of conspiracy, the prosecution must prove (1) that an agreement existed, (2) 
that it had an unlawful purpose, and (3) that the defendant was a voluntary par-
ticipant.”52 
Section 1839 of the EEA defines trade secrets broadly.53 A “trade secret” 
is information that “the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep 
. . . secret,” and that “derives independent economic value, actual or potential, 
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through 
proper means by, the public.”54 In order to establish a violation of the EEA, 
federal government prosecutors must prove: “(1) that the information is actual-
ly secret because it is neither known to, nor readily ascertainable by, the pub-
lic; (2) that the owner took reasonable measures to maintain that secrecy; and 
(3) that independent economic value was derived from that secrecy.”55 The 
language of § 1839(3) further provides that information is to be protected re-
gardless of its form.56 Thus, information in electronic or intangible form is pro-
                                                                                                                           
 45 Based on the author’s examination of EEA indictments from 2008 to 2013, thirty-two of fifty 
defendants were Chinese nationals. The countries with the next highest numbers were South Korea 
(eight) and the United States (five). The sources consulted for this analysis are on file with the author. 
 46 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1832. 
 47 See id. § 1831. 
 48 See id. § 1832. 
 49 Id. § 1832(a). 
 50 See id. (including as an element, “intending or knowing that the offense will . . . injure any 
owner”). 
 51 See id. §§ 1831(a), 1832(a). 
 52 United States v. Martin, 228 F.3d 1, 10–11 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 53 See 18 U.S.C. § 1839. 
 54 Id. § 1839(3)(A)–(B). 
 55 United States v. Chung, 659 F.3d 815, 824–25 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 56 See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (“[T]he term ‘trade secret’ means all forms and types . . . whether 
tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored . . . .”). 
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tected under the EEA. It is significant that the drafters of the Act (in the early 
1990s) had the foresight to include this coverage, given that virtually all trade 
secret misappropriation today, especially cyber misappropriation, involves 
trade secrets stored electronically. 
In order to address the concern that foreign governments and foreign enti-
ties are attempting to steal U.S. trade secrets, the reach of the EEA extends 
outside the boundaries of the United States. If the theft of a trade secret occurs 
in a foreign country, jurisdiction may be asserted if: (a) the defendant is a U.S. 
citizen or corporation, or (b) any “act in furtherance of the offense” was perpe-
trated within the United States.57 Unfortunately, this provision has not proven 
sufficiently useful to be widely utilized. Part of the reason is because prosecu-
tors do not have the appropriate enforcement and service mechanisms to use 
against individuals who are outside of the United States. 
The number of prosecutions under the EEA has been relatively low. Since 
the Act was passed in 1996, there have been about 100 indictments and few 
convictions.58 One reason for this paucity is the fact that prosecutors are un-
likely to use their limited resources to prosecute an economic crime where the 
victim-company has a readily available, and perhaps better suited, civil cause 
of action and remedy. Many companies also choose not to report espionage to 
the government for prosecution, with one report noting that in 2005, only 
about fifteen percent of detected incidents were reported to law enforcement.59  
Commentators have speculated as to why that may be the case.60 There 
are several reasons why a trade secret owner may be disinclined to report a 
trade secret misappropriation claim to criminal authorities. First, if a report is 
filed and a criminal prosecution is brought, the trade secret owner effectively 
loses control of the situation and any parallel civil case may be stayed pending 
resolution of the criminal case. Second, because the trade secret owner lacks 
control of criminal proceedings, there is a greater risk that its trade secrets will 
be exposed (and thereby lost) during the criminal proceeding. Third, there is 
often a public relations concern if news of trade secret misappropriation be-
comes public, particularly for publicly-traded companies whose stock prices 
may be negatively affected. 
                                                                                                                           
 57 See id. § 1837. 
 58 See COMM’N ON THE THEFT OF AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP., THE IP COMMISSION REPORT 42 
(2013), http://www.ipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission_Report_052213.pdf [https://perma.cc/
WL5S-CAB6]. 
 59 See RAMONA R. RANTALA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CYBERCRIME AGAINST BUSI-
NESSES, 2005, at 2 (2008), http://www.justiceacademy.org/iShare/Library-BJS/CyberCrimes.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UQX6-MPLV]. 
 60 See, e.g., Argento, supra note 5, at 215–18. 
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B. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act is a federal law that was adopted (be-
fore the advent of the commercial use of the Internet) to address the problem 
of computer hacking, and it does not directly address trade secret misappropri-
ation.61 Unlike the EEA, however, it includes a private right of action that 
some plaintiffs use to bring state trade secret claims before the federal courts. 
The CFAA makes it a crime for anyone to intentionally access a computer 
without authorization, or surpass authorization, in order to access “information 
from any protected computer.”62 Because the principal wrongdoing as defined 
by the CFAA is “accessing a protected computer,” its provisions conceptually 
overlap with the improper acquisition provisions of trade secret law.63 Thus, if 
the facts of a trade secret case involve the acquisition of trade secrets that are 
stored on a computer, the plaintiff in a civil trade secret case might also pursue 
a criminal prosecution under the CFAA. 
Whether the defendant’s access to the subject computer was unauthorized 
or exceeded existing authorization is at the heart of a CFAA claim. Of particu-
lar concern is whether a violation of ubiquitous “terms of use agreements” can 
make some activities “unauthorized” for purposes of the CFAA.64 Similar con-
cerns are raised with respect to common provisions of employment agreements 
and confidentiality agreements that limit computer access. 
Sometimes the CFAA, in effect, serves as a federal trade secret law. It can 
be used to capture those who intentionally access a protected computer without 
authorization, regardless of whether or not the information accessed was a 
trade secret.65 Some courts have interpreted the statute broadly to create liabil-
ity where employees access data in violation of a general duty of loyalty or 
confidentiality to the employer. Thus, although the employee may have had 
access to the computers, violating an employment policy or exceeding authori-
zation to access certain information can create liability.66 Other courts interpret 
the statute more narrowly, requiring unauthorized access to the computers ra-
                                                                                                                           
 61 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030. 
 62 Id. § 1030(2)(C). 
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ther than merely unauthorized use of information.67 The broader interpretation 
creates liability not just for hacking, but for any unauthorized appropriation or 
use of the data. 
It is also worth noting in the context of this Article that the broad frame-
work provided under the CFAA for addressing cyberattacks may also threaten 
the legitimate work of security researchers. That is because some of the activi-
ties and processes that are necessary to identify and assess weaknesses in cy-
bersecurity arguably violate the CFAA.68 Researchers have complained that 
when they identify vulnerabilities or bugs in systems and disclose their find-
ings to manufacturers, technology providers, or those otherwise responsible for 
repairing such weaknesses, they have been threatened with legal action both 
civilly and criminally.69 As a result, there have been calls to clarify the CFAA 
or to explicitly exempt these kinds of research activities from its reach.70 
C. Why Law Is Not the Answer 
The EEA cases almost all involve employees who obtained their employ-
er’s trade secrets and transferred them to a competitor, often a foreign competi-
tor. For example, a product development manager downloaded dozens of files 
containing confidential product information and transferred them to a competi-
tor.71 A design engineer transported stolen “data sheets” containing his em-
ployer’s proprietary information to a potential foreign competitor.72 An em-
ployee stole his employer’s back-up tapes and offered them for sale to a com-
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petitor.73 Finally, an information technology specialist sold his employer’s con-
fidential information for $3 million dollars.74 
Sometimes it is not employees who steal trade secrets, but third parties or 
others with access to information. In one case, a college student stole sensitive 
trade secrets belonging to DirecTV while he was working for a copying service 
employed by DirecTV’s outside counsel.75 In another case, two Harvard Medi-
cal School post-doctoral research fellows were accused of stealing marketable 
scientific information belonging to Harvard.76 The pair shipped more than thir-
ty boxes of biologicals, books, and documents to a competing lab.77 They then 
further collaborated with a Japanese company in the creation and sale of relat-
ed and derivative products, and otherwise capitalized on the information.78 
A deeper analysis of the scenarios presented in the facts of these cases re-
veals some underlying, systemic issues related to technology that will continue 
to make legislative and judicial solutions suboptimal for cyber misappropria-
tion. Subsection 1 explores how the nature of trade secret information as intan-
gible makes security a challenge.79 Subsection 2 discusses how the nature of 
the information through the architecture of the Internet makes it difficult to 
identify offenders.80 Finally, subsection 3 examines how, because the Internet 
has increased the likelihood of offenders being outside of the country, prosecu-
tion can be even further hindered.81 
1. Intangible Information 
Trade secret law is the primary area of intellectual property law that co-
vers how we control, protect, acquire, and use information. But this kind of 
“property” right in information presents a huge challenge because of its pre-
sent-day form as electronically stored data. The intangible nature of infor-
mation has significant implications for how we regulate and control that in-
                                                                                                                           
 73 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former IT Director of Silicon Valley Company Pleads 
Guilty to Theft of Trade Secrets (Aug. 1, 2005), http://www.justice.gov/archive/criminal/cybercrime/
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 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 See infra notes 82–84 and accompanying text. 
 80 See infra notes 85–88 and accompanying text. 
 81 See infra notes 89–91 and accompanying text. 
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formation and others’ use of it. Indeed, in some ways it is akin to trying to cap-
ture air. With real property we can build fences, use locks, and attach alarms. 
Traditionally, that was the model that we used and developed to protect trade 
secrets.82 A new day has come, however, and that model may not serve as well 
going forward. 
The prevalence of cyber misappropriation makes evident the fact that how 
we capture, corral, and lock up proprietary information has left us wanting and 
needing more effective mechanisms and tools, from both a legal and business 
perspective, to better protect our information. In this digital age, securing in-
formation can be especially daunting because once a trade secret has been dis-
closed, even inadvertently, it ceases to be considered as such and loses all pro-
tection (unlike a patent).83 This makes trade secrets extremely vulnerable, and 
makes misappropriation easier and more prevalent than ever before.84 
2. Identifying Culprits 
The intangible nature of information, when taken from its owner, makes 
detection of the loss and identification of the culprits particularly difficult.85 
When a trade secret stored in electronic form is stolen, the misappropriator has 
often taken a copy of the data but left the original intact and in place.86 Accord-
ingly, it may be a while before anyone notices that the information has been 
taken, and weeks, months, sometimes even years may pass before the loss is 
detected. 
This delay through the passage of time in and of itself reduces the likeli-
hood that the offender, particularly if he or she was not an employee, might be 
identified. Granted, if the perpetrator is an employee it can be easier to track 
and make an identification from the company’s computer logs upon discovery 
of the misappropriation. But when the culprit is on the outside, the situation is 
more challenging. Compounding the problem is the fact that the architecture of 
the Internet allows for disguises and makes it difficult to trace the source of an 
intrusion. Observing certain patterns to identify hackers is not a reliable way to 
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 83 See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 
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identify the source of a hack. Sometimes hackers share tools, which makes it 
even harder to identify or tie certain tactics to a particular group.87 It is also 
possible to hire an independent hacker to infiltrate a system, thus making iden-
tification of the true source even more difficult.88 This can be especially chal-
lenging if a hacker is working outside of the country. 
3. Cross-Border Incidents 
Because it is easier to access intangible information from anywhere in the 
world, and to do so in a manner that is unlikely to be detected, the Internet has 
thus vastly expanded the potential threat of actors successfully reaching and 
accessing American trade secrets. Even when foreign offenders are identified 
and espionage charges may be filed under the EEA, prosecution in the United 
States can be severely hindered. Complicating prosecution is the fact that of-
fenders who live outside the United States would need to be extradited back to 
the United States, and not all countries permit extradition for these types of 
offenses.89 Although the EEA includes a provision for extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion for acts of trade secret misappropriation even if outside the United States, 
in practice it is not a meaningful remedy.90 Prosecutors do not have the appro-
priate enforcement and service mechanisms with which to serve individuals 
and entities that are not located in the United States. In reality, violators cannot 
fully be charged and indicted under a system unless and until they are within 
its borders.91 
III. WHY CYBERWAR IS NOT THE ANSWER 
In any discussion of cybersecurity, the rhetoric of war from the govern-
ment is hard to miss. We are “fighting a cyber-war;”92 we are at risk for a 
“cyber-Pearl Harbor.”93 According to the U.S. Department of Defense, 
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cyberattacks can constitute an “act of war.”94 Words and phrases like attacks, 
strikes, cyber operations, national security threats, cyber warfare, waging war, 
geopolitical assaults, and digital battlefield have become commonplace in the 
narrative about cybersecurity.95 This Part will evaluate the use and implications 
of the choice of this rhetoric, and draw parallels to the War on Drugs from the 
1980s that might be instructive in placing this current societal challenge 
against a backdrop of a similarly complex historical issue implicating law and 
culture.96 
The rhetoric of war can also be a political marketing tool used to persuade 
the public to support certain public policy issues.97 Along with the “War on 
Drugs” we have had the “War on Poverty,” the “Cold War,” and the “War on 
Terror.”98 This metaphorical militaristic rhetoric encourages a focus on a spe-
cific enemy that threatens national security (directly or indirectly), potentially 
frightens or motivates the public to mobilize against the enemy, and engages in 
a struggle to win no matter how high the financial or other costs (including 
sometimes those related to civil liberties).99 
This is not to suggest that the underlying problems targeted by these 
“wars” are not real or urgent. Nevertheless, it is important to consider the ef-
fect that the marketing and presentation of the problem might have not only on 
the public, but also on policymakers and stakeholders. It is also very important 
that such rhetoric not stifle or inhibit debate in the exploration of various 
viewpoints on the issue.100 
Although the government appears to have recognized and to be taking the 
threat to and protection of trade secrets very seriously, the rhetoric of war that 
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is beginning to accompany the government’s strategy for addressing the prob-
lem is likely to be counterproductive and not effective. Moreover, it might lead 
to a misplaced reliance on the government to address a problem that is, in the 
first instance, best addressed on a more micro, company level. Not only are 
putative trade secret owners required to take reasonable efforts to protect their 
trade secrets, but in the age of cyber intrusions and relatively invisible theft of 
trade secrets, it is a practical reality that cannot be overlooked. Whatever met-
aphorical war might be waging between the government and its enemies, there 
is no substitute for building stronger defenses in the private sector.  
A. The Cyberwar 
Threats from cyber espionage have been framed as threats to our national 
security. According to President Obama, it is “one of the most serious econom-
ic and national security challenges,”101 and a “rapidly growing threat.”102 
Heads of the FBI and national intelligence agencies have identified the cyber 
threat as the top global threat facing America,103 rivaling and even surpassing 
that of terrorism.104 
In October 2012, President Obama signed a directive authorizing the fed-
eral government to act defensively and counterattack with cyber operations 
under the Presidential Policy Directive 20.105 The directive instructs the gov-
ernment to identify potential foreign targets that could be the subject of “Of-
fensive Cyber Effects Operations” if ordered by the President.106 The directive 
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appears to recommend preparation of counter cyberattacks against foreign 
threats, execution of cyber operations in the United States, and implementation 
of cyber intelligence-gathering against other nations.107 Although the full ex-
tent of what is authorized under this directive remains unclear, as a whole it 
empowers the National Security Agency to fight cyber espionage by taking 
both proactive and defensive steps to deter these attacks.108  
Some commentators have noted the effects of a cyberwar on the criminal-
ization of conduct occurring online. For instance, some point to the aggressive 
use, expansion, and penalties under the CFAA and question whether it will ac-
tually serve as an effective deterrent.109 Others point to the prosecution of 
those who download information that was already made public, as well as the 
move to upgrade hacking to a racketeering offense, which could snare poten-
tially innocent players as members of a “criminal enterprise.”110 In particular, 
there is concern that cybersecurity professionals and researchers might be at 
risk due to the potentially overbroad laws or overzealous enforcement.111  
Concerns have also been raised that the government might effectively be 
treating hacking as an act of war by equating hacking tools to weapons of war. 
For instance, a rule proposed by the Bureau of Industry and Security seeks to 
create a new definition of “intrusion software,” making it more difficult to ex-
port computer security tools.112 Security researchers are concerned that these 
new classifications might inhibit their work.113 
B. Parallels to the “War on Drugs” 
In thinking about the rhetoric of war as used in the context of cyber espi-
onage, and the possible implications stemming from the narrative of war to 
frame a problem, a useful analogy and point of reference is the earlier “War on 
Drugs” in the United States. It also serves as a reminder that criminal law, by 
itself, may not always be the best way to fix behavioral and societal issues, 
even when those issues appear on a large scale. It is widely believed, even by 
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the current administration, that the war rhetoric was “counterproductive” for 
drug enforcement.114 
President George H.W. Bush’s first address to the nation in 1989 began, 
“All of us agree that the gravest domestic threat facing our nation today is 
drugs.”115 The War on Drugs, which began under the Nixon Administration but 
intensified under the presidencies of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, 
was accompanied by a great expansion of government authority, including 
wiretapping, search warrants, and civil forfeiture laws.116 But many have ar-
gued that it did not lead to significant positive changes.117 One lesson for the 
cyber misappropriation problem might be that more focus is needed on the 
people and their motivations, rather than a tunnel-vision focus on enforcement. 
Knowing why people hack, what motivates them to do it, and what they hope 
to gain from it might actually lead to addressing the problem on a deeper level 
and place us in a better position to find solutions.118 
C. Who Is the Enemy? 
If news and government reports119 are any measure, the face of our 
cyberwar enemy—who must be feared and stopped—is China and its hacking 
crews. Some refer to it as a “fake war”120 ongoing between China and the 
United States, as the two giants hurl accusations and threats against each other 
for cyber intrusions and theft of trade secrets. Although there is documented 
evidence that Chinese companies have attempted to steal and have successfully 
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stolen trade secrets from American companies,121 and indeed there are more 
prosecutions under the EEA against Chinese citizens than any other group,122 
the precise measure and scale is unknown.123 Coincidentally, this bears some 
resemblance to the presence of a common enemy in the War on Drugs.124 Nev-
ertheless, the fact is that trade secret holders have a universal base of potential 
enemies from whom to protect their trade secrets. Regardless of the extent of 
China’s involvement in cyber misappropriation, it would be wise not to be dis-
tracted by the news media’s constant focus on China and its hackers, and focus 
more on security protocols to protect trade secrets. As one commentator has 
amusingly noted, “The Chinese are like the Kardashians . . . . [Y]ou mention 
China in an attack, and every radio or news station picks it up.”125 Thus, taking 
steps to protect information, no matter who or what the source of the intrusion 
or misappropriation, must remain the paramount concern. To that end, this sec-
tion will explore how the Internet, foreign governments, employees, and out-
side hackers all stand as formidable enemies in the battle to protect companies’ 
crown jewels.126 
1. The Internet 
In previous work I have explained how the Internet is a dangerous place 
for trade secrets.127 Those discussions focused on the posting of trade secret 
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information on the Internet by employees or outsiders, and the resulting loss of 
trade secret protection from that conduct. This Article views the Internet dan-
ger from a different angle: as a borderless medium that allows stealth intru-
sions (and thus misappropriation) of trade secrets by anyone from anywhere in 
the world. In addition, the interconnected nature of the Internet provides the tie 
that binds governments and businesses, public and private sectors, and national 
and international parties. It provides the ease and the framework with which 
intruders can infect systems, ultimately affecting individual businesses and 
large-scale economies in the process.128 
The tools available for those interested in committing cybercrimes have 
become widely available, and are not reserved for those with the highest levels 
of training and expertise. In fact, there is a hot and active market for “zero-
day” exploits, Trojans, botnets, and other do-it-yourself kits, as well as easy 
connections between buyers and sellers in this underworld.129 This easy access 
and entry for those with malicious motivations place trade secrets at significant 
risk. 
2. Foreign Governments 
Foreign governments have used strategic cyberattacks in growing num-
bers,130 and some view these as geopolitical assaults on the United States.131 
Alleged threats from Syria, China, and Russia illustrate how the problem be-
comes a national security threat rather than simply an economic issue.132 Even 
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countries that one may not necessarily think of as a hacking center, like Indo-
nesia, may nonetheless still serve as a formidable opponent in the hacking 
war.133 Commentators have discussed the ways in which these foreign coun-
tries have infiltrated and attacked targets in the United States, generally gain-
ing access to the media, the providers of public infrastructure services, and 
implicating more than trade secrets.134 There is even a real-time world map 
that one can view to observe attack origins and targets as they occur.135 
Many countries, including Russia, France, Israel, India, Japan, Taiwan, 
and China, allegedly engage in cyber espionage against U.S. companies. In our 
rhetoric of war, however, one public enemy emerges in the narrative, and that 
appears to be China.136 According to one public official, “[The Chinese] are 
stealing everything that isn’t bolted down, and it’s getting exponentially 
worse.”137 One report accuses the Chinese of being “the world’s most active 
and persistent perpetrators of economic espionage.”138 The close relationship 
between the Chinese military and its state-owned companies might also con-
tribute to its position as chief culprit. The U.S. government believes that up to 
fifty percent of the Chinese economy is controlled by the state, and that indus-
trial espionage is an articulated mission of its intelligence services.139 Both the 
government and private companies have also implicated China in alleged 
thefts of proprietary and trade secret information.140 
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China has denied the allegations and has stated its official position against 
hacking.141 Chinese Premier Li Keqiang also seeks an end to the “groundless 
accusations,”142 and Chinese diplomats have denounced reports of Chinese 
espionage as “baseless, unwarranted and irresponsible.”143 Moreover, because 
hackers can disguise the source of their attacks by spoofing an Internet Provid-
er address (“IP address”), it is possible that attacks that appear to be coming 
from China might actually have originated elsewhere, including within the 
United States.144 Whether the enemy is a Chinese attacker, a Russian crime 
group, or an angry former employee, a focus on protecting and defending one’s 
own proprietary information, rather than relying on the government to fight an 
enemy or battle, is ultimately the most productive and effective way to stem 
the loss of company trade secrets. 
In a recent case, a group of Chinese defendants were indicted under the 
EEA and the CFAA for wide-scale theft of trade secrets against several Ameri-
can companies, spanning from 2006 to 2014.145 This case provides an illustra-
tion of the ways in which foreign governments or entities can use technology 
to obtain access to and steal trade secrets. According to the indictment, mem-
bers of the Chinese military conspired to hack into the computer systems of 
several businesses in order to steal trade secret information for the benefit of 
Chinese competitors.146 For instance, one of the defendants is alleged to have 
stolen proprietary and confidential designs and specifications for pipes for a 
nuclear power plant that Westinghouse Electric Company was contracted to 
build.147 SolarWorld, a German solar product company operating in the United 
States, was also allegedly hacked by the defendants, and thousands of emails 
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containing information such as cost structures and production capabilities were 
stolen.148 
One of the defendants was also charged with using a tactic called “spear 
phishing” to obtain access to computers at U.S. Steel Corporation.149 This in-
volved sending an email message to an employee at U.S. Steel that was de-
signed to trick the employee into allowing the defendant access to the compa-
ny’s computers.150 Senior managers at Alcoa Inc., an aluminum manufacturer, 
were also targeted with spear phishing messages in an attempt to obtain trade 
secrets.151 The spear phishing messages usually looked like emails from col-
leagues, and contained attached files or hyperlinks within the messages that, 
once opened, would install malware or malicious code onto the computer sys-
tem, thus creating a “backdoor.”152 The defendants, acting as co-conspirators, 
tried to mask the identity and location of the computers from which they were 
operating their hacking activities by using “hop points,” or computers belong-
ing to other victims.153 
3. Employees, Hackers, and RATs 
Ironically, although companies are likely to believe that attackers and 
misappropriators will be hackers, foreign governments, competitors, and others 
outside of the company, the reality is that the biggest threat to company trade 
secrets has always been from the inside. Employees and others with access to 
the inside of the business are responsible for a large majority of trade secret 
theft, whether through cyber misappropriation or otherwise.154 Misappropria-
tion from insiders is also likely to be more costly155 to companies.156 Accord-
ingly, as we continue to fight the battle in cybersecurity and to protect trade 
secrets, it is important to remember that building technological walls to defend 
against invaders and intruders is only part of the solution. Instead, even more 
careful consideration must be paid to the humans who are already inside of the 
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gates, and who are able and willing to use deception and other vices to obtain 
sensitive information.157 
Several recent cases illustrate how humans and technology can be a peri-
lous combination when it comes to keeping trade secrets safe. The former em-
ployees of an executive search firm allegedly used their usernames and pass-
words to copy and download trade secret information from a company data-
base before leaving to start a competitive venture.158 A government employee 
used his work computer to download and transfer files containing source code 
from the Citadel.159 In another case, a Massachusetts employee on the verge of 
being terminated ordered his assistant in China to encrypt secret project files 
on the company’s Chinese server.160 The files were then condensed, password-
protected, and sent to the employee at home, and the original files were de-
stroyed.161 This effectively blocked the company from accessing its own files 
after the defendant left because he refused to divulge the password.162 
Competitors are often involved, either directly or indirectly, with alleged 
acts of cyber misappropriation. In one case, competitors accused each other of 
stealing electronically stored trade secrets, such as pricing and sales infor-
mation, customer lists, and customer profiles.163 The accused company in the 
case allegedly hacked into the plaintiff’s computers and website, gaining ac-
cess to passwords and login information with which it later obtained trade se-
crets.164 Over a period of about three years, employees were also allegedly in-
volved in supplying secret information to the competitor before leaving to join 
that competitor.165 
One company allegedly induced a disloyal employee to steal proprietary 
financial modeling software from a competitor after the competitor had turned 
down an offer to purchase the company’s business unit.166 This employee was 
a trusted director of information technology at the company, and he allegedly 
accessed about 15,000 confidential computer files and emailed them to the 
competitor.167 He also downloaded and copied the plaintiff’s proprietary busi-
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ness models onto a laptop for the benefit of the competitor and his soon-to-be 
new employer.168 
Websites can be fair game as a source for trade secret misappropriation, 
as well. One company used the login name and password of a subscriber to its 
competitor’s website in order to “sneak in” to view information available to the 
competitor’s subscribers.169 Its officers also allegedly hacked into the source 
code used by the competitor to operate its website, taking advantage of a back-
door opportunity created by the competitor’s failure to install a patch that had 
been distributed by Microsoft.170 In another case, the defendant company and 
its employee allegedly hacked into a competitor’s website by sending “elec-
tronic robots” to launch attacks and steal confidential source code and confi-
dential customer information.171 This kind of “extraction software” is used to 
search, copy, and retrieve information from websites.172 The plaintiff was able 
to track the attacks to IP addresses tied to the defendant competitor.173 
Hacking refers to a wide range of activities where a person intrudes upon 
or accesses a system belonging to another without the appropriate authoriza-
tion.174 Not only can computers be hacked, but virtually any other device or 
equipment that contains a computing system can also be vulnerable, such as 
cars, airplanes, and medical devices.175 Indeed, right around the corner, the 
“Internet of things”—which is predicated on people being more connected to 
their devices—may leave consumers and trade secret owners even more vul-
nerable.176 The digital components found in cars, insulin pumps, pacemakers, 
and even home refrigerators will provide more of a playground and greater 
opportunities for hackers.177 
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Although insiders or employees can certainly be hackers,178 the term in 
the context of trade secret misappropriation typically tends to refer to outsid-
ers. For example, a citizen of Sweden was extradited to the United States after 
he was indicted on several counts of conspiracy to commit computer hack-
ing.179 He was the founder of an organization that developed malware, which 
included a remote access tool that could remotely control the victims’ comput-
ers by capturing their keystrokes and searching through their files.180 The RAT 
could also scan hard drives for other confidential information such as credit 
card numbers.181 In 2014, there were highly publicized hacks at such well-
known companies as Target, Home Depot, J.P. Morgan Chase, and Sony.182 
The kinds of information obtained from these hacks included not only con-
sumer information like credit card information, but confidential, trade secret 
information as well.  
There appears to be a thriving cybercrime market for this kind of trade 
secret information, and the kinds of tools that allow hacking are now widely 
and easily available.183 Accordingly, gone are the days when only those with 
the highest computer programming skill levels could engage in this behavior. 
Today, one can hire a hacker or purchase exploit kits that contain all the soft-
ware for creating and managing attacks.184 It has also become the province of 
organized crime, perhaps in some ways easier and more lucrative than selling 
drugs.185 The demographic characteristics of the typical hacker today suggests 
that person is likely to be male and under the age of thirty.186 Hackers can in-
clude everyone from spies to dissatisfied employees, political activists, and 
even teenagers playing computer games.187 
Hackers are not, however, all cut from the same cloth. Distinctions are be-
ing made between “good” hackers and “bad” hackers, or “ethical” hackers and 
“unethical” hackers. There is even a color-coding system for the various cate-
gories, with intent separating White Hats from Black and Grey Hats.188 White 
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Hats tend to be security researchers who are hired to find security flaws.189 
Black Hats access systems to commit a crime, and Grey Hats are between the 
two, sometimes crossing the line in violating the law, but choosing to report 
security vulnerabilities.190 Indeed, many hackers believe that unless their ac-
cess is motivated by malicious intent, the practice should be legitimate.191 The 
term “hacktivist” refers to those who hack for politically motivated reasons, 
trying to send a political message through a civil disobedience model.192 Com-
panies’ trade secrets can be caught in the crossfire, as these hackers might seek 
to embarrass the company or harm its reputation.193 
Some companies hire hackers or former hackers to test the vulnerabilities 
of their systems. This practice can be controversial.194 Some argue that it pro-
vides the wrong incentives to hackers, in that it may serve as a pathway to 
landing a great job.195 One could also question whether companies should trust 
“reformed hackers” with such access to their systems.196 Some companies now 
offer “bug bounty programs,” providing rewards to hackers who identify vul-
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nerabilities.197 One of the many criticisms of the CFAA is that it captures and 
criminalizes all kinds of hackers, including legitimate security researchers.198 
IV. EXPLORING SELF-HELP AND SELF-DEFENSE 
In the United States, there is no centralized government control or regula-
tion of the Internet. Instead, the private sector, and in particular each company, 
is responsible for securing its own networks.199 Companies cannot afford to 
rely on the government or on law enforcement to stem cyber misappropriation 
of their trade secrets. One drawback of the war rhetoric is that it might lead to 
an overreliance on the government to “fight the war,” rather than focus on each 
company’s ability and obligation to protect its own trade secrets. Under both 
the state civil law requirements and the EEA, putative trade secret owners must 
engage in reasonable efforts to protect confidential information before it re-
ceives the protected status of a trade secret. As will be discussed below, this 
sets the floor for a certain level of active efforts, appropriate to the circum-
stances, by which each company must act to guard its trade secrets. 
The most likely source for trade secret misappropriation is still an insider, 
such as an employee or a business partner.200 Even though cyber misappropria-
tion from an outsider will be a less likely occurrence, these intrusions can be 
particularly damaging, especially if the attacker uses a sophisticated technique. 
For example, when employing an advanced persistent threat, the attacker 
breaches and lurks in the company’s computer systems for months or years, 
monitoring activities and gathering information.201 
Companies are right to fear and be concerned that the most significant 
losses might come from the outside.202 This underscores the value and im-
portance of protecting electronic data, engaging in self-help, and being proac-
                                                                                                                           
 197 See Kirsch, supra note 118, at 397 (discussing bug bounty programs at Google, PayPal, and 
Facebook). 
 198 See id. at 394–97; see also supra notes 61–70 (Part II.B, discussing how security researchers 
have faced legal action under the CFAA for exposing system vulnerabilities). 
 199 See Melanie J. Teplinsky, Fiddling on the Roof: Recent Developments in Cybersecurity, 2 AM. 
U. BUS. L. REV. 225, 232–33 (2013) (discussing this “self-regulatory” approach to cybersecurity). 
 200 See Peter J. Toren, An Analysis of Economic Act Prosecutions: What Companies Can Learn 
From It and What the Government Should Be Doing About It!, 84 BLOOMBERG BNA PAT., TRADE-
MARK & COPYRIGHT J. 1, 5 (2012) (stating that the defendant was a company “insider” in over 90% 
of EEA prosecutions); see also David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litiga-
tion in Federal Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 303 (2010) (reiterating that the majority of misappro-
priations are committed by employees or business partners); David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical 
Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in State Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57, 69 (2011) (stating that the 
thief was an employee or business partner in 93% of state cases and 90% of federal cases). 
 201 See ALPEROVITCH, supra note 87, at 2. 
 202 See ASIS INT’L, TRENDS IN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION LOSS 28, 33 (2007), https://
foundation.asisonline.org/FoundationResearch/Publications/Documents/trendsinproprietaryinfor-
mationloss.pdf [https://perma.cc/YK78-WQNV]. 
2016] Trade Secret Misappropriation and Cybersecurity 409 
tive in defending against all potential attacks through computers and the Inter-
net, regardless of the source. It is also why relying solely on criminal laws or 
government policy to sufficiently protect individual businesses in the cat and 
mouse game of cyber misappropriation is an approach that will lead, at best, to 
unsatisfactory results without a self-help component. This Part will explore 
several initiatives, including self-help, self-defense, and government actions, 
as well as special considerations related to smaller companies, as they tend to 
be overshadowed and overlooked in discussions about cybersecurity and cyber 
misappropriation.203  
A. Reasonable Efforts 
In almost every state, the reasonable efforts requirement is embedded in 
the threshold legal question of trade secret misappropriation analysis: whether 
the plaintiff owns a legally protectable trade secret.204 The Uniform Trade Se-
crets Act (“UTSA”), which has been officially adopted by forty-seven states 
and the District of Columbia,205 includes reasonable efforts as part of the defi-
nition of a trade secret.206 Reasonable efforts require that in order to qualify for 
trade secret protection, the information must be “the subject of efforts that are 
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”207 The states that 
have not adopted the UTSA rely on the older codification of trade secret law in 
the Restatement (First) of Torts.208 Even the Restatement (First) of Torts, how-
ever, requires a trade secret holder to show more than mere intent to protect 
something as a trade secret; actual effort to keep the information secret is nec-
essary.209 Thus, the Restatement (First) of Torts includes “the extent of 
measures taken by [the trade secret owner] to guard the secrecy of the infor-
mation” as one of six factors to be considered in determining whether infor-
mation qualifies as a trade secret.210 
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Similar to the UTSA, the EEA also includes a reasonable efforts require-
ment in defining a trade secret.211 The EEA requires that “the owner thereof 
has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret.”212 This provi-
sion withstood a void for vagueness challenge in federal district court, with the 
court finding that the term “reasonable measures” is not unconstitutionally 
vague.213 As a result, the showing of actual effort to preserve secrecy, required 
since codification of the Restatement (First) of Torts,214 continues to be appli-
cable under the EEA and in both UTSA and non-UTSA jurisdictions. The re-
quirement is securely grounded in trade secret jurisprudence. 
Although the above sources of law provide the underpinning for the rea-
sonable efforts requirement, they do not provide precise standards for the 
courts on how to determine whether the requirement has been met.215 The in-
terpretation of the requirement appears to be similar in all jurisdictions such 
that for the purposes of this Article no further distinctions are necessary be-
tween UTSA and non-UTSA states. Whether a trade secret owner has utilized 
appropriate safeguards sufficient to meet the reasonable efforts requirement is 
a question of fact, based on the particular circumstances.216 These decisions 
necessitate a balancing between using sufficient precautions to protect a com-
pany’s secret on the one hand, without imposing overly burdensome precau-
tions that would impair the functioning of its business on the other hand.217 
The inquiry necessarily calls for a cost-benefit analysis, which varies in each 
case based on the costs of the protective measures relative to the attendant 
benefits of protecting the information.218 The costs to the trade secret owner 
will not only include direct financial costs, but also indirect costs, such as the 
ability to make appropriate use of the information in the business by sharing it 
with employees and others who need to use it.219 
In the context of cyber misappropriation and cybersecurity generally, 
there is no such thing as an impenetrable fortress. Fortunately, the reasonable 
                                                                                                                           
fort or money expended by [the business] in developing the information; (6) the ease or 
difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by oth-
ers. 
Id. 
 211 See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A) (2012). 
 212 Id. 
 213 See United States v. Hsu, 40 F. Supp. 2d 623, 628 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (“[A] statute is not void for 
vagueness merely because it uses the word ‘reasonable’ . . . .”). 
 214 Many courts, in both UTSA and non-UTSA jurisdictions, continue to rely on and cite to the 
Restatement (First) of Torts. See POOLEY, supra note 208, § 2.02[3] n.12. 
 215 See Note, Trade Secret Misappropriation: A Cost-Benefit Response to the Fourth Amendment 
Analogy, 106 HARV. L. REV. 461, 462 (1992). 
 216 See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 176–77 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 217 See id. at 178–80. 
 218 See id. at 179. 
 219 See id. at 180. 
2016] Trade Secret Misappropriation and Cybersecurity 411 
efforts requirement does not mandate absolute secrecy.220 “Rather, the standard 
is one of relative secrecy; a trade secret owner needs to take steps that are rea-
sonably necessary under the circumstances to maintain secrecy.”221 A plaintiff 
in trade secret litigation must show that it took affirmative steps and concrete 
efforts to preserve the confidentiality of the alleged secret information.222 
Some courts note that in addition to requiring employees to sign confidentiality 
agreements, “reasonable efforts” can include “advising employees of the exist-
ence of a trade secret, limiting access to the information on a ‘need to know 
basis,’ . . . and keeping secret documents under lock.”223 Other reasonable ef-
forts include “[t]he use of security guards, closed-circuit television monitors, 
access codes for information stored on a computer, and varying security access 
levels for different areas of the facilities.”224 
Efforts to protect secrecy are also tied to the requirement that trade secrets 
have value. Whether or not a company took adequate steps to protect a secret 
is considered evidence of the subjective belief that the information was a trade 
secret, and therefore worthy of protection.225 For example,  
Some courts may reason that there is a direct relationship between 
the value of the information and the extent to which the company 
made efforts to protect it such that the more valuable the infor-
mation to the company, the more costly or extensive the measures 
ought to be to protect it.226  
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Furthermore, where a plaintiff makes a strong showing of reasonable efforts to 
protect trade secret information, a court is more likely to infer that the defend-
ant improperly obtained the information.227 But a trade secret owner who is lax 
about taking precautions to guard the secret cannot expect to prevent others 
from using it.228 Thus, “a court may use the reasonable efforts requirement to 
deny a plaintiff any protection under trade secret law.”229 Even when a plaintiff 
creates a trade secret protection plan providing for how secrets will be safe-
guarded, a court could find, vis-à-vis the hypothetical reasonable person, that 
failure to adequately follow the plan is unreasonable conduct.230 
B. Introducing TRAP 
In order to effectively combat the kinds of remote access tools, or RATs, 
that can remotely control a victim’s computer and access their files, it is neces-
sary that companies take a more active stance to protect their trade secrets. Ac-
cessing remotely without needing to be on the same premises has opened up 
the world of potential perpetrators, setting up an unwieldy cat and mouse 
game. Accordingly, this Article introduces the acronym TRAP for “technologi-
cally responsive active protection” to serve as a guiding principle that further 
refines the reasonable efforts requirement for the protection of trade secrets. 
Consistent with every putative trade secret owner’s duty to protect its trade 
secrets, rather than being passive in its efforts, TRAP reinforces the need to 
take initiative and be self-reliant in preparing and implementing security plans 
to protect against trade secret misappropriation through electronic means. 
The enormous challenges that technology presents through the intercon-
nected framework of the Internet raises the stakes in protecting proprietary 
information. The larger problem of cybersecurity and espionage is clearly a 
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matter of national concern, and a cooperative stance between the public and 
private sectors will always be essential. Nevertheless, each company must 
build its own fortress in this “war,” rather than rely on external sources for pro-
tection. Active protection certainly requires consideration of technological 
tools. The use of such tools to protect, hide, or fight back must be considered. 
For example, some companies build fake networks, create fake documents, or 
build beacons into their documents that provide more information about who 
has taken property, not just that it was compromised.231 Although many of 
these tools are considered passive, other more aggressive techniques are be-
ginning to emerge as options. Hacking back is an example of an active defense 
mechanism, but one that is controversial. The nature of that controversy will be 
further explored later in this Part.232 
Many companies do not invest sufficiently in cybersecurity and protecting 
their trade secret information.233 Moreover, to the extent that a company’s net-
work may be interconnected with others, vulnerability can be shared on a larg-
er scale as companies increasingly connect over the Internet.234 Thus, guarding 
and protecting one’s own secrets and assets has benefits beyond each individu-
al company. The private sector can therefore, as a practical matter, play an im-
portant role in increasing security. 
Companies may choose not to invest, or to invest minimally, in security 
for a host of reasons. The financial costs associated with shoring up networks 
and computers can be a deterrent, especially when for many companies the 
return on investment is uncertain.235 This problem can be particularly acute 
with small businesses.236 Not only are the financial costs more likely to be 
burdensome, but these businesses might be more likely to underestimate or 
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downplay their risks.237 Small businesses are also less likely to have the kinds 
of internal policies in place to secure their information.238 
Technologically responsive active protection encompasses the view that 
as a result of technology, trade secret protection has become far more difficult. 
As such, effective approaches must account for these technological advances, 
including the interconnectedness of all systems and the intangibility of the 
kinds of information that companies seek to protect. Accordingly, reasonable 
efforts to protect trade secrets in this context must be active and ongoing, and 
must integrate people and processes for optimal protection. Indeed, because 
the existence of technological controls might in itself create a false sense of 
security, it is imperative that the role of the people in implementing technolog-
ical processes effectively be underscored. 
Although much is made of the role of technological responses to combat-
ing trade secret misappropriation and other kinds of cyberattacks, the role of 
human behavior is largely overlooked despite its prevalence: “[H]uman error 
accounts for 35%–53.5% of cyber breaches caused by preventable employee 
error or sabotage from within a company in both the public and private sec-
tors.”239 Another recent report found that over 60% of the electronic espionage 
cases in 2014 involved opening emails with malicious links or attachments.240 
Yet another report in 2014 places the number of security incidents attributable 
to human error at an even higher rate of 95%.241 Apparently, it is such a sure 
thing that employees will open these kinds of emails that “sending emails to 
just ten employees will get hackers inside a corporation’s system 90 per cent of 
the time.”242 So important is the role that employees play within any organiza-
tion’s security protection program that some companies, Lockheed Martin for 
instance, employ tactics such as tricking their employees into opening suspi-
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cious emails to help ensure that their message on security is actually being im-
plemented.243 
The reasons why employees misappropriate trade secrets, even without 
criminal intent, can be due to a wide range of factors, including complacency, 
apathy, ignorance, and stress.244 But regardless of motivation, the primary line 
of defense in protecting trade secrets must account for employees and their 
human tendencies.245 Accordingly, employees must be appropriately trained as 
well as informed about protecting the company’s trade secrets and confidential 
information, and security procedures must be strictly enforced. 
A well-considered security plan will include analysis of both internal and 
external risks, consider the nature of the trade secret information to be protect-
ed, appropriately tailor reasonable security measures to protect the sensitive 
information, and ensure ongoing assessment and review of the security plan in 
order to update what weaknesses appear.246 Experts believe that even the most 
basic steps to protect against cyber intrusions could prevent about eighty per-
cent of such attacks.247 How money is spent is also of significance. For in-
stance, it is best that companies do more than just protect against perimeter 
attacks generally designed to detect breaches, and become more aware of de-
veloping intelligence about threats.248 It is also highly recommended that com-
panies encrypt information so that even if it is stolen, it will have no value to 
the thief.249 
Looking ahead, it will be interesting to see the role that insurance plays in 
encouraging companies to beef up their security. As companies purchase poli-
cies to reduce their expected losses from attacks, insurance companies will 
likely play a role in helping to develop best practices, as well as encouraging 
companies to adopt those practices to reduce their premiums or as a precondi-
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tion to coverage.250 This might serve as a motivating factor for companies to 
invest in technological and other tools to protect against misappropriation. The 
best security plans must also account for human error, recognizing that even 
the smartest technological tools can be undermined by human behavior.251 Alt-
hough this Part so far has discussed technological tools generally as one large 
grouping, the next section252 separates out passive tools from the more contro-
versial active defense tools, illustrating that choices for active protection lie 
along a spectrum. 
C. Active Defense and Hacking Back 
Defensive measures to computer security include firewalls, encryption, 
automated detection of intrusions, and education of employees and users of 
computer systems.253 In the parlance of cybersecurity, these are considered 
passive measures.254 Somewhere between these passive measures and more 
active defense measures are approaches that, for instance, use decoy sites to 
attract hackers. These are known as “honeypots.”255 Honeypots can be created 
to work as traps to capture information about intrusions.256 One limitation of 
honeypots is that they only work when there has been direct communication 
from an attacker.257 Another method known as a “sandbox” isolates execution 
of code to help better protect the integrity of an entire system that may be in-
fected with malicious code.258 A limitation of this approach is that the sandbox 
could be bypassed.259 Accordingly, some commentators believe that reliance 
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on passive defense features alone are insufficient for optimum protection,260 
and others consider honeypots and sandboxes to be active defenses rather than 
passive.261 
On the other end of the spectrum from passive defense mechanisms are 
active defenses. More active and offensive measures are beginning to emerge 
as companies become more proactive against hacking. An active defense al-
lows a company to detect an intrusion, trace it, and actively respond to the 
threat. This could include interrupting an attack in progress in order to lessen 
the damage that it may cause, all the way to counter-striking the attacker.262 
The technique of beaconing is also an active defense technique that, when at-
tached to an electronic file, alerts when it has left an authorized network and 
also potentially identifies its location in the event it is stolen.263 Other versions 
of this type of decoy or trap on files to detect attacks include techniques known 
as “web bugging,” “meta-tagging,”264 and “watermarking.”265 Another more 
aggressive approach might be inserting code into confidential files so that if 
stolen, the data would self-destruct.266 New business models are also emerging 
to assist corporations in dealing with the problem. Innovative companies are 
developing technology to assist companies in their defense against online 
threats. CrowdStrike, Endgame, and CloudFare are examples of startups enter-
ing this market.267  
1. The Hacking Back Controversy 
The pursuit of active defense is currently very controversial.268 This is so 
for legal, technical, and political reasons. There are those who argue strongly 
in favor of this approach and those who oppose it. The larger debate in this 
area is usually about cyberattacks generally, including not just businesses but 
public infrastructure, wider national security issues, and international implica-
tions.269 Continuing to draw on the war rhetoric in this area, active defense in 
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military terms refers to “[t]he employment of limited offensive action and 
counterattacks to deny a contested area or position to the enemy.”270 Interest-
ingly, however, the White House and the Department of Defense have not 
adopted the uniform definition for “active defense” in the context of cyberse-
curity.271 In technical and legal circles, the phrase generally refers to the use of 
technology to respond directly to attacks.272 The Justice Department’s position 
is that companies should not hack back into an attacker’s computer.273 Since 
this Article focuses specifically on trade secrets, it will not engage in that wid-
er debate. 
In 2010, a group from China allegedly hacked into Google’s network and 
those of many other U.S. companies.274 Not only did Google successfully trace 
the source of the attack, but it also engaged in a counter-offensive move to ob-
tain evidence about the culprits.275 This has come to be known as “hacking 
back.”276 Google is not alone among large companies that are beginning to re-
taliate or respond to hacking in this manner.277 Another Fortune 500 company 
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also allegedly used software that slowed an intrusion and blocked the hacker’s 
computer from the company’s website.278 It is believed that more companies 
will pursue this option.279 The full extent of these measures, as used by com-
panies currently, are and will likely remain unknown.280 For one thing, firms 
generally do not publicly disclose that they are engaging in this behavior for 
much the same reason that they keep private when they have been hacked.281 
Potential negative questions or publicity associated with hacking back might 
also serve to discourage such public announcements.282 These measures no 
doubt remain controversial.283 
When a company hacks back it mounts a counterattack against its attack-
er, often trying to damage the perpetrator’s system. There are various ways to 
do this, some of which might include trying to overload the servers from which 
the attack originated in an attempt to prevent them from continuing the intru-
sion, or directly hacking into the servers responsible for the original attack.284 
One of the goals of the strategy is to de-incentivize and deter hackers while 
also improving corporate security. Some argue, however, that the deterrence 
effect is of limited use.285 This kind of active defense strategy presents an op-
portunity to respond quickly to attacks, and some believe that, among other 
reasons, they may serve to deter hackers by increasing costs to them.286 
Nevertheless, the approach is not without its shortcomings and potential 
pitfalls. There is a chance, for instance, that these kinds of counterstrikes might 
miss their targets and hit the wrong ones, thereby harming innocent third par-
ties.287 Attackers can also disguise their location so that a counterstrike affects 
a third-party and not the perpetrator.288 Attackers often “spoof” their IP ad-
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dresses in order to evade detection.289 Thus, a strike back against the apparent 
origin of the attack might harm an innocent victim whose computer was used 
as a “zombie” by the hacker.290 Another concern is that private companies’ re-
sponses might be excessive or disproportionate as they eagerly pursue a retal-
iatory objective. 
2. Legal Implications 
Some of the complicated issues around hacking back or retaliatory 
cyberattacks include the legal implications and ability of this method to serve 
as an effective deterrent. It is unclear whether this behavior is legal, but it is 
evident that better guidelines will be needed to address when such activities 
are legitimate and which should be sanctioned. For instance, such conduct may 
violate the CFAA.291 On the international level, there are also questions about 
state-to-state engagement, and conduct between private individuals or compa-
nies across borders.292 
Consistency among definitions, beginning with what constitutes a 
cyberattack, would also be necessary. Cyberattacks tend to refer to “the use of 
deliberate actions . . . to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy adversary 
computer systems or networks.”293 Perhaps more applicable to trade secrets, 
the term “cyber exploitations” often refers to actions that are not constructive, 
but that nonetheless remove confidential information from a network.294 Nev-
ertheless, the terms are often conflated with a cyberattack, referring to intru-
sions upon a network. 
In any case, regardless of the terminology, counterstrikes like hacking 
back are highly controversial and potentially violate the CFAA.295 Even those 
who favor the use of this kind of self-defense caution that more study and reg-
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ulation may be required in order to establish appropriate guidelines for legiti-
mate use of counterstrikes that minimize collateral damage.296 On some level, 
the practical reality suggests that any prosecution for this kind of behavior 
would be highly unlikely unless an innocent victim files a complaint or notifies 
law enforcement, especially since the hackers themselves will not be alerting 
law enforcement. 
In drawing the appropriate lines, fine distinctions might be necessary to 
better match the legal ramifications with the technology. Questions abound. 
Which of these would be acceptable: destroying the attacker’s system, limiting 
their bandwidth, and/or attaching a “beacon” to confidential files to allow no-
tice when the file has left the authorized network and potentially identify the 
location of the file if it is stolen?297 Should companies receive immunity for 
counterstrikes against hackers? Is striking against an attack analogous to self-
defense? Is it analogous to the “stand your ground” doctrine in criminal 
law?298 All of these are questions that need further and deeper exploration as 
legislators and policymakers continue the debate and wrestle with this difficult 
area. 
D. Education and Supplementary Initiatives 
As we await resolution and answers on these active defense questions 
from policymakers in courts, it may be that one of the best ways to address 
cyberattacks generally, and cyber misappropriation specifically, is through ed-
ucation. In the longer term, educating children about cybersecurity and safe 
practices, in addition to developing an appreciation for the protection of trade 
secrets and intellectual property rights, can be a supplementary and comple-
mentary approach to the larger national issues in this area. Working toward a 
cultural shift in the way we think about cybersecurity can have the most lasting 
effect. In the short-term, educating small businesses is also critical. 
As technology has become part of the fabric of the current culture in 
which children are raised, it is worth paying attention to the moral and legal 
norms that surround how technology is and should be used. Researchers have 
found that when one’s peer group is involved in computer crime, this encour-
ages others in the group to do the same.299 Accordingly, there is a role for edu-
cation to help shape socially acceptable and legally acceptable behaviors and 
norms in teaching children about access to computers.300 Thus, to the extent 
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that hacking is seen as part of the fun and games attendant with technology, 
children and young adults must be taught what behaviors are legally acceptable 
and which are not. This is likely to help shape the collective consciousness 
over the long-term. To the extent that part of the attraction of hacking and oth-
er such activities is due to curiosity301 and a sense of competition, educators 
may want to consider creating environments in which students can build on 
these skills in an appropriate educational framework.302 
Further, developing a greater understanding of the harm and costs to vic-
tims—as well as a respect for trade secrets and other proprietary information—
can go a long way to educate the public, particularly those that are not crimi-
nally motivated in the first place. For instance, there are those who believe that 
unless an intrusion is maliciously motivated, it is not unethical or illegal.303 
This is the kind of thinking that needs to be adjusted. 
1. Small Companies 
The larger discussions and voices around hacking, cyber misappropria-
tion, and trade secret protection often are or make reference to large, well-
known companies.304 The significance and implications for smaller companies 
also deserve attention, as a thorough exploration of this issue would be remiss 
without consideration of small companies. Indeed, trade secret law, because of 
its initial low cost to entry and lack of government formalities to obtain its pro-
tections, is widely used and heavily relied upon by small businesses.305 Ironi-
cally, they are also the entities that are probably less likely to be willing to ex-
pend large sums of money on reasonable efforts to protect their trade secrets. 
Nor are they likely to have the same level of access to attorneys and other ad-
visors (including internal IT departments) to advise them of the importance of 
protecting their trade secrets in general and defending against cyber misappro-
priation in particular. 
According to a recent report from Symantec, about sixty percent of 
cyberattacks in 2014 were aimed at small306 and medium-sized businesses.307 
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This represented an increase of about thirty percent from the previous year.308 
It suggests that not only are these businesses themselves at risk, but other 
companies with which they do business are also at risk, especially when the 
smaller business partner has its systems connected to those of the larger entity. 
The vulnerability can create a back-door access to proprietary information, 
placing the entire supply chain at risk.309 
Smaller companies may suffer from the misconception that they are not 
fruitful targets for cyberattackers, and as such may not be willing, or some-
times simply not financially able, to invest sufficiently in securing their confi-
dential information.310 Instead, these companies tend to rely on antivirus pro-
tection as their defensive stronghold.311 As a result of not paying enough atten-
tion to their security, however, they make themselves easier targets, placing the 
sensitive information belonging to those with whom they do business (both 
businesses and consumers) at even greater risk.312 In addition to limited budg-
ets and expertise to implement comprehensive security protocols, small busi-
nesses often are not as aware of the risks, and do not train their employees to 
identify risks or to engage in safer conduct.313 Although they cannot be ex-
pected to have the same level of complex systems in place as larger entities, 
smaller businesses still must engage in reasonable efforts (that best match the 
enterprise) to protect their trade secrets. Accordingly, educating and raising 
awareness among this large and most vulnerable segment of trade secret own-
ers is critical. 
2. Government Initiatives 
Law enforcement itself is also resorting to technological tools in the fight 
against cyber espionage. In September 2013, the Department of Justice rec-
ommended an amendment to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
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dure that would expand the territorial limits for searching electronic data.314 In 
effect, this would authorize courts to issue warrants that would be executed by 
remotely accessing computers located outside the district where the court is 
located. The idea is that it would allow law enforcement to investigate crimes 
involving botnets and other anonymizing technologies used in cybercrime. 
Under the proposed amendment to Rule 41,  
Law enforcement could seek a warrant either where the electronic 
media to be searched are within the United States or where the loca-
tion of the electronic media is unknown. In the latter case, should 
the media searched prove to be outside the United States, the war-
rant would have no extraterritorial effect, but the existence of the 
warrant would support the reasonableness of the search.315 
Although this certainly might make it easier to conduct investigations, both 
domestically and internationally, the propriety of these programs used to con-
duct remote searches will raise constitutional and territorial questions.316 
To the extent that government regulatory agencies have begun to mandate 
reporting or greater security within companies, this could also serve to encour-
age further investment in security. For instance, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) issued guidance in October 2011 requiring companies to 
report “material information regarding cybersecurity risks and cyber inci-
dents.”317 Such disclosures are also tied to the relevant insurance coverage. 
Those two forces, insurance in the private marketplace coupled with govern-
mental regulation, might provide other ways to incentivize at least those com-
panies within the SEC’s reach.318 
The Obama Administration is also considering amending the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act to include computer fraud: a move 
that would mean significant increases in penalties.319 The Cyber Intelligence 
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Sharing and Protection Act, which was passed by the House of Representatives 
in April 2013, included an amendment that did not permit hacking back.320 But 
the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2014, designed to enhance and 
provide protections from liability for sharing of information between private 
corporate entities and the government, was passed out of the Senate Intelli-
gence Committee.321 
3. Approaches Outside the United States 
Because challenges related to cybersecurity are occurring on a global 
scale, it is no surprise that the governments of many countries have undertaken 
plans and initiatives to address them. Along with the United States, among the 
countries taking serious note are Canada, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, 
and the United Kingdom.322 The United States is arguably the leader in think-
ing about and attempting to integrate cybersecurity in both the political and 
business sphere.323 With respect to the use of self-defense measures by the pri-
vate sector, there is no general consensus (as of yet) on the issue. There is a 
proposal in the Netherlands to permit law enforcement officials to hack inter-
nationally, but the proposal does not discuss private parties.324 Similarly, Israeli 
Defense forces have the right to use “offensive cyber operations,” but Israel 
takes no position on whether those in the private sector are permitted to do 
so.325 In Germany, however, it is illegal to hack back.326 Nevertheless, German 
companies have reportedly used hacking back, and the practice appears to be 
tolerated.327 Countries are likely to approach this complicated issue in different 
ways to account for their unique cultural, government, and business sector 
concerns. The European Union, for instance, appears to be taking the approach 
of implementing mandatory standards, whereas the United States has tended 
more toward self-regulation.328 Moving forward, there is a need to build a con-
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sensus on these kinds of active self-defense measures, both within the private 
sector and between nations. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has undertaken the formidable task of exploring cyber mis-
appropriation and espionage within the larger problem of cybersecurity in the 
United States. Recognizing the significance of economic espionage to our na-
tional economy and national security, the government has embraced the rheto-
ric of war to frame the larger debate. This Article cautions that companies ul-
timately must look inward and re-conceptualize their roles, not as bystanders 
or onlookers, but as participants responsible for building their own TRAPs and 
fortresses to protect their trade secrets and proprietary information. Reliance 
on legislative and judicial intervention and enforcement alone will never be 
enough to offer adequate protection in a world where technologies, like RATs, 
permit easy access to American companies’ trade secrets from anywhere in the 
world. Self-help is the first line of defense, without which the “war” cannot be 
won. Using TRAP as a guiding principle, companies may need to implement a 
layered security system that covers personnel as well as technology in order to 
mitigate risks. Even though perfect security is impossible to achieve, active 
protection can serve to lower risks of trade secret misappropriation through 
cyber misappropriation. 
